(Editor’s Note: Over the last years AFSI has published a number of articles on Iraq critical of the conduct of the war and of the notion that it was in the realm of the possible to create a liberal, democratic Iraq. Diana West has been among the most prescient about the war, as this five year old column of December 23, 2006, on the then newly announced “surge” proves.)
Sure, let’s go ahead and say this new “troop surge” being bandied about Washington comes off, and tens of thousands of additional American troops pacify enough of Iraq to pull off what President Bush this week called the Iraqi dream–“a stable government that can defend, govern and sustain itself.”
OK. So then what? It’s not hard to imagine that the United States would take the first opportunity to wish that dream-come-true government well in defending, governing and sustaining itself, and then high-tail it back home.
But that’s no strategy. That’s an escape hatch. What happens after that?
Looking back on, lo, our many costly years of liberation and occupation in Iraq, what would it turn out that we had actually won? In other words, what, in this best-case scenario, is “victory” supposed to look like?
This is an important question. But it’s one that is never, ever asked, let alone discussed. For reasons I can’t altogether explain, tunnel vision on Iraq has led to a kind of dead-end thinking on Iraq. Amid what amounts to a group failure of imagination on the part of our Big Brass and Deep Thinkers, no one takes into account, or even seems curious about what exactly “victory” in Iraq might mean, or, more important, might gain for the United States of America and friends.
To the president, victory must seem self-evident, which is why he will say things like, “Success in Iraq will be success.” Taking the opposite tack, the new secretary of defense explains also that “failure would be a calamity.” But neither of them–and no one else, either–offers much more in the way of hard detail. “Success” may well be the stabilized Iraqi government the president waxes pre-nostalgic about, and “failure” may well be the absence of that “success,” but none of this talk counts for enlightening debate.
What I want to know is what happens if this much-discussed American troop surge actually manages to secure Iraq, which then emerges as a natural ally of Iran and perhaps Syria? Will we salute U.S. efforts that brought into the (Islamic) world another Shi’ite dominated, pro-Hezbollah, anti-American, anti-Israel sharia state with lots of oil? To me, such “success” sounds more like the “failure” that is usually described, roughly, as the loss of American face or the transformation of Iraq into a terrorist haven. In the aftermath of any “victory” in Iraq that benefits Iran more than the United States, our face wouldn’t look so hot with all that egg on it, and the world would surely have a new terrorist haven.
So maybe “more troops” to shore up the Iraqi government doesn’t give us a bona fide win in the so-called war on terror–which is, of course, what this intervention in Iraq was supposed to achieve in the first place. That’s not a failure of our great military; it’s a failure of our best intentions. The next question is, what can we salvage from battle for the United States?